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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from the district court’s judgment dismissing Appellant

Arnold Dean Anderson’s petition for post-conviction relief.
B.

General Course of Proceedings
1.

Facts relevant to underlying criminal proceedings

Arnold’s daughter, Jennifer, owned a 2002 Chrysler with darkly tinted
windows. Jennifer found herself short on cash and added her father to the car’s title
to facilitate obtaining a title loan. Tr. (45047, 2-2-17) p. 19, ln. 14-20; p. 23, ln. 13 p. 24, ln. 1. Jennifer frequently asked her father to repair the vehicle and he moved
it to the parking lot behind his apartment to work on it. Id. at p. 24, ln. 5-24; p. 26,
ln. 16 - p. 27, ln. 3; p. 36, ln. 13-19; p. 51, ln. 8-22. A friend, Berdine who lived in the
apartments was interested in purchasing the Chrysler from Jennifer and
periodically borrowed it for transportation to work in December 2012. Id. at p. 25,
ln. 3 - p. 26, ln. 4; p. 27, ln. 19-22; p. 51, ln. 8-22.
The evening of January 6, 2013, Berdine asked Jennifer to retrieve the car
because there was something wrong with it. Id. at p. 33, ln. 24 - p. 34, ln. 9; p. 37,
ln. 14-25. Arnold met Berdine at the apartment building to discuss the repairs. Id.
at p. p. 51, ln. 8-25. Officer Woodward observed the Chrysler parked partially on the
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curb next to an apartment complex. Tr. (41730, 4-30-13) 1 p. 174, ln. 11-17. The
officer circled the block in order to approach the Chrysler from the rear and then
followed the car as it traveled down the street. Id. at p. 174, ln. 16 - p. 175, ln. 1.
The Chrysler pulled off the road near its original location. Id. at p. 175, ln. 2-11.
Officer Woodward initiated a traffic stop, alleging that Arnold failed to signal. Id. at
p. 175, ln. 2-16.
Arnold admitted his driving privileges were suspended and explained he had
only been driving around block because Berdine was interested in purchasing the
car. Id. at p. 177, ln. 1-23. Arnold complied with Officer Woodward’s request to hand
him a brown paper bag in between the front passenger seat in the center console.
The officer pulled a two-thirds full bottle of Black Velvet from the bag and Arnold
denied knowing the bottle had been opened. Id. at p. 178, ln. 2-23.
Officer Woodward removed Arnold from the vehicle, placed him under arrest
for driving without privileges and placed him in the back of the patrol vehicle. Id. at
p. 179, ln. 1-17. At some point, Officer Applewhite arrived on the scene and
supervised Berdine. According to Jennifer and Arnold’s son Jacob, Berdine was
unsupervised in the passenger seat when they arrived on scene. Tr. (45047, 2-2-17)
p. 29, ln. 1-24; p. 41, ln. 13 - p. 42, ln. 21. At the evidentiary hearing, Arnold and
The district court judicially noticed or admitted a number of transcripts from the
underlying criminal case. Appellant intends to file a request in this Court to
consider those documents. The transcripts are cited by their respective docket
numbers in this appeal.
1
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Officer Applewhite testified that Officer Applewhite had not yet arrived on scene at
the time Officer Woodward removed Arnold from the vehicle. Id. at p. 76, ln. 22 - p.
77, ln. 16; p. 116, ln. 20 - p. 117, ln. 1. Conversely, according to Officer Applewhite’s
trial testimony, Arnold was seated in the vehicle when he arrived and that he
maintained close watch on Berdine while the Officer Woodward removed Arnold
from the vehicle. Tr. (41730, 4-30-13) p. 201, ln. 1 - p. 202, ln. 20.
After placing Arnold in his patrol car, Officer Woodward removed Berdine
from the vehicle and searched it. Id. at p. 179, ln. 20 - p. 180, ln. 3. Officer
Woodward located a baggie in between the center console and the driver’s seat, with
what appeared to be marijuana and a small plastic container on the floor in
between the driver’s door and the driver’s side seat, with a small amount of what
later tested positive for methamphetamine. Id. at p. 181, ln. 1 - p. 182, ln. 12.
Arnold was transported to jail and charged with possessing methamphetamine.
After Arnold had been transported to jail, Jennifer approached the officer and
asked to retrieve her vehicle. At first the officer’s declined, indicating that it was
Arnold’s vehicle but then acknowledged Jennifer’s vehicle and allowed her to take
custody of it. p. 28, ln. 1-20; Exh. (54730) Transcript Of Police Audio CD Files, No.
2851296 p. 54, ln. 24 - p. 56, ln. 19.
Arnold asked trial counsel to call his daughter as a witness so she could
explain that Arnold’s relationship to the car was a mechanic and that others,
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including Berdine, had access to it. Tr. (45047, 2-2-17) p. 58, ln. 9 - p. 59, ln. 2.
Arnold asked trial counsel to test the container for fingerprints and to obtain
independent analysis of its contents, but he refused. Id. at p. 57, ln. 9 - p. 58, ln. 6;
p. 60, ln. 14 - p. 61, ln. 20. Arnold asked his attorney to provide all discovery but did
not hear all the audio recordings, including the portion where his daughter retrieves
the car, until his direct appeal was pending. Id. at p. 61, ln. 21 - p. 62, ln. 25;
Exhibit 14.
At trial, trial counsel failed to call Jennifer as a witness, failed to present
other evidence that Arnold was the vehicle’s mechanic, failed to present other
evidence that Berdine and others had prior access to the vehicle and failed to
present evidence that Berdine was unsupervised in the vehicle. The state was thus
able to argue to the jury that Berdine had “very little previous contact with that car,
if ever” and no opportunity to place the container on the driver’ side. Tr. (45047,
2-2-17) p. 245, ln. 18-20. The jury found Arnold guilty of possession of
methamphetamine.
After trial, trial counsel and Arnold got into an argument during a conference
that had been scheduled to review the PSI. Id. at p. 64, ln. 1-10. As a result, Arnold
was unable to inform trial counsel of several mistakes in the PSI, including that he
had been convicted of eight prior felonies. Id. at p. 64, ln. 10 p. 65, ln. 10. Arnold
was arrested in a new criminal case the night before he was scheduled for
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sentencing in the first case and the matter was re-scheduled. App. Exh Tr.
(CV42-15-3479, 7-9-13) p. 26, ln. 10-22.
After the argument, another attorney was assigned to represent Arnold at
sentencing and to represent him in a second case pending trial. Id. at p. 66, ln.
16-23; p. 68, ln. 11 - p. 69, ln. 11; see also Augmentation 4-15-15, 41730. The new
attorney also failed to review the PSI with Arnold and ignored his requests for
discovery in the new case. On October 1, 2013, the second attorney appeared on
Arnold’s behalf and the district court inquired whether conflict of interest issues
had been resolved with the public defender’s office. Tr. (41730, 10-1-13) p. 3, 14-19.
Counsel responded that Arnold wished to hire private counsel and was preparing a
post-conviction relief petition pertaining trial counsel’s representation. Id. at p. 3,
ln. 20 - p. 4, ln. 2. Counsel explained the chief public defender had decided their
office would continue representing Arnold in the pending cases. Id. at p. 4, ln. 3-5.
After the district court denied the bond reduction, Arnold informed the
district court: “I’d like to file a motion to have [the second attorney] relieved from
the case.” Id. at p. 12, ln. 2-3. The district court replied: “Denied. It’s denied.” Id. at
p. 12, ln. 4. Three days later, the district court explained that he had summarily
denied the request because there had been insufficient time to hear it that day. Tr.
(41730, 10-4-13) p. 13, 18-24. The district court recognized that Arnold had a right
to be heard and so scheduled a hearing. Id. at p. 13, ln. 24 - p. 14, ln. 4. Arnold
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explained that the second attorney was with the same office as the first attorney,
who had provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to call witness,
fingerprint the container and present evidence to defend his case. Id. at p. 15, ln. 11
- p. 16, ln. 8. Arnold indicated it was inappropriate to have a different public
defender from the same office that had provided ineffective assistance of counsel
and against he was preparing a petition for post-conviction relief. Id. at p. 21, ln.
15-24.
The district court indicated it would provide Mr. Anderson with a postconviction packet, that had forms to assist him. The district court further found that
Mr. Anderson’s claims against the initial public defender did not impact the current
public defender’s duties to represent Mr. Anderson at sentencing in the first case
and to defend him in the second. Id. at p. 25, ln. 3 - p. 26, ln. 7. The district court
denied the motion to discharge the public defender and advised Mr. Anderson he
could represent himself or hire counsel. Id. at p. 27, ln. 1-24.
At sentencing, trial counsel failed to inform the district court of any
corrections to the PSI. Tr. (41730, 11-21-13) p. 4, ln. 20-24. The district court
imposed a unified sentence of ten years with a minimum period of confinement of
three years fixed. Id. at p. 15, ln. 1-3.
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2.

Post-conviction relief proceedings

On September 14, 2015, Arnold filed an application for post-conviction relief
alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and asked the district court to judicially
notice transcripts and documents from the underlying criminal case, which he
attached to his application. R. 20-158. The district court appointed counsel and
entered a scheduling order. R. 159-168.
Arnold moved the district court for an order to prepare verified court
transcripts, audio discs and metadata of all hearings in his criminal cases. R. 247.
Arnold explained that the transcripts failed to accurately reflect the proceedings
and that the metadata would ensure their accuracy. The district court ordered that
certified transcripts be provided at county expense and that counsel could compare
those transcript with the audio recordings. Tr. (45047, 5-16-16) p. 10, ln. 4-17; see
also R 271. The district court denied the request for metadata without prejudice Tr.
(45047, 5-16-16) p. 10, ln. 20-25. At a subsequent status conference, Arnold
expressed continued concern that transcripts and audio recordings had been
altered. Tr. (45047,11-14-16) p. 5, ln. 12 - p. 9, ln. 25; p. 13, ln. 25 - p. 14, ln. 5; p. 21,
ln. 21 - p. 23, ln. 3. The district court again denied Arnold’s request for the
metadata. Id. at p. 23, ln. 4-8.
At the evidentiary hearing, Jennifer testified regarding her ownership of the
vehicle, its darkly tinted windows, Berdine’s use of the vehicle throughout
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December 2012 and on the night in question, and her observation that Berdine was
unsupervised during the traffic stop. Tr. (45047, 2-2-17) p. 19-21. Jennifer and
Arnold’s son testified that when they arrived on the scene, their father was in the
patrol car, Berdine remained in the passenger seat and no officer stood outside the
passenger door. Id. at p. 29, ln. 1-24; p. 41, ln. 13 - p. 42, ln. 21.
Trial counsel testified that he did not present Jennifer as a witness because
Arnold did not want to accuse her of possessing methamphetamine Id. at p. 103, ln.
3-19. Counsel did not present Berdine because he concluded he was likely to testify
Arnold knew of the methamphetamine. Id. at p. 101, ln. 1-20. Trial counsel further
testified that he did not see a benefit to having the substance independently tested
and that Arnold decided against fingerprint testing. p. 101, ln. 21 - p. 103, ln. 1. The
district court accepted trial counsel’s explanations as sound strategy and dismissed
Arnold’s petition. R. 654-680. This appeal follows.
III. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Did the district court err in dismissing Arnold’s petition for post-

conviction relief because he established that trial counsel provided ineffective
assistance of counsel?
2.

Did the district court err in denying Arnold’s request for a forensic

examination of the metadata?
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IV. ARGUMENT
A.

Arnold Established That He Received Ineffective Assistance Of
Counsel By A Preponderance Of Evidence
1.

Standard of Review

When reviewing a district court's decision deny a petition for post-conviction
relief following an evidentiary hearing, this Court will disturb the district court's
factual findings when they are clearly erroneous. I.R.C.P. 52(a); Wurdemann v.
State, 161 Idaho 713, 717, 390 P.3d 439, 443 Booth v. State, 151 Idaho 612, 617, 262
P.3d 255, 260 (2011); Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 921, 828 P.2d 1323, 1326 (Ct.
App. 1992). Ineffective assistance of counsel presents a mixed question of law and
fact in which this Court defers to the district court's factual findings if supported by
substantial evidence and exercises free review over the application of the relevant
law to those facts. Wurdemann, 161 Idaho at 717, 390 P.3d at 443; Booth, 151 Idaho
at 617, 262 P.3d at 260
2.

Trial counsel’s failure to call critical witnesses and present
evidence was the result of inadequate preparation and
objectively unreasonable

Article 1, Section 13 of the Idaho State Constitution and the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantee criminal defendants the
right to the effective assistance of counsel. Murray v. State, 156 Idaho 159, 164, 321
P.3d 709, 714 (2014); Booth, 151 Idaho at 617, 262 P.3d at 260. Ineffective
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assistance of counsel claims require the post-conviction petition to prove: (1) the
attorney performed deficiently and (2) the deficiency prejudiced the defendant.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984); Wurdemann, 161 Idaho at
717, 390 P.3d at 443.
A post-conviction petitioner establishes his attorney's performance was
deficient by proving his attorney's representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688; Wurdemann, 161 Idaho at 717, 390 P.
3d at 443. Counsel’s strategic and tactical decisions can justify relief when the
petitioner shows the decisions resulted from inadequate preparation, ignorance of
the relevant law or other shortcomings capable of objective review. Wurdemann, 161
Idaho at 717, 390 P.3d at 443; McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567, 570, 225 P.3d 700,
703 (2010). Ultimately, “the standard for evaluating attorney performance is
objective reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.” Wurdemann, 161
Idaho at 717, 390 P.3d at 443; State v. Mathews, 133 Idaho 300, 306, 986 P.2d 323,
329 (1999). Under the second prong, the defendant must show a reasonable
probability that the outcome of trial would be different but for counsel's deficient
performance. McKay, 148 Idaho at 570, 225 P.3d at 703; State v. Row, 131 Idaho
303, 312, 955 P.2d 1082, 1091 (1998). A reasonable probability is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694;
McKay, 148 Idaho at 570, 225 P.3d at 703.
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Here, as a result of inadequate preparation and investigation, trial counsel
failed to present witnesses to establish that Arnold was the vehicle’s mechanic,
establish that Berdine had prior access, to refute the officer’s testimony Berdine
was supervised at all times, to obtain fingerprint analysis and to acquire
independent testing of the alleged methamphetamine. Trial counsel failed to
provide Arnold with discovery, which would have enabled him to meaningfully
assist his counsel in preparing for trial. The evidence trial counsel failed to present
would have directly refuted the state’s theory of the case and, therefore, Arnold
established a reasonable probability that but for trial counsel’s ineffective
assistance, the result of the trial would have been different.
a.

trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel
by failing to interview Jennifer and present her
testimony

Jennifer’s testimony would have refuted the state’s claim that Berdine had no
prior access to the car, established that Arnold was the vehicle’s mechanic and
established she was the primary owner. The district court found that trial counsel
failed to call Jennifer as a witness because Arnold did not “desire not to ‘point the
finger’ at his daughter.” R. 669. The district court failed to recognize that trial
counsel misconstrued the relevance of Jennifer’s testimony and, thus, its finding
regarding deficient performance are clearly erroneous. Further, had Jennifer
testified regarding Arnold and Berdine’s respective relationships with the car, the
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outcome of the trial would have been different. The district court therefore erred in
concluding trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to
call Jennifer as witness.
i.

deficient performance

Trial counsel testified that he and Arnold:
discussed accusing his daughter of possessing methamphetamine, and he
asked if she could be charged. And I said, “I guess if I'm convincing enough,
she could.” And we decided not to try to accuse her and focus on [Berdine].
Tr. (45047, 2-2-17) p. 103, ln. 15-19. However, had trial counsel interviewed
Jennifer, he would have known the purpose of Jennifer’s testimony was not accuse
her of possessing methamphetamine. Instead, trial counsel would have learned that
Jennifer would have testified that when she arrived at the scene, Berdine was
unsupervised in the vehicle. Tr. (45047, 2-2-17) p. 30, ln. 14-22. Jennifer also would
have outlined that Berdine had the car for much of December 2012 and had driven
it earlier on the day in question. Id. at p. 31, ln. 10-16; p. 34, ln. 1-7; p. 37, ln. 14-25.
Jennifer’s testimony that the tint on the windows made it difficult to see inside the
car would have contradicted Officer Applewhite’s testimony the windows were not
tinted. Id. at p. 19, ln. 14-20.
Moreover, Jennifer’s testimony that she was the primary user of the vehicle
would have explained Arnold’s limited relationship to the vehicle as a mechanic,
with minimal to no risk of incriminating herself. It was objectively unreasonable for
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counsel to advise there was any realistic risk that Jennifer would be charged with
possessing the container found after Arnold’s arrest.
Jennifer attempted to communicate with Arnold’s attorney and offer to testify
but the attorney refused to discuss the case with her. Tr. (45047, 2-2-17) p. 30, ln.
1-22. Trial counsel admitted speaking with Jennifer “generally” about the facts of
the case but did not go into detail because she was not “his client.” Id. at p. 110, ln.
8-15. Jennifer testified that she had been willing to testify and could have testified
that the car was hers. Had trial counsel taken the time to discover what Jennifer
knew about the car and the case, he would have discovered the relevance of her
testimony.
Trial counsel’s apparent belief that the utility of Jennifer’s testimony was
limited to blaming her for the methamphetamine must have been based on
inadequate preparation and was not a sound strategic decision. Arnold provided
that trial counsel provided deficient performance in not calling his daughter.
ii.

prejudice

The district court further found that Jennifer’s testimony “as to why
Anderson’s name was on the title is very minimally relevant, if relevant at all.” R.
670. The district court thus concluded Arnold did not establish that “testimony
about why he was an owner would have changed the outcome of the proceeding.” R.
670-71
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However, the state’s opening statement and closing argument establish the
prejudice from trial counsel’s failure to establish Arnold and Berdine’s respective
relationship to the car. In opening, the state told the jury that the evidence would
show that the “defendant was sitting it in the driver's seat in his own car right next
to where the methamphetamine was found and “that the passenger was only in the
vehicle to ride around the block so that he could see the vehicle operate; and that
the passenger had no access to and no opportunity to access the location where the
methamphetamine was recovered.” Tr. (41730, 4-30-13) p. 171, ln. 21-23; p. 172, ln.
1-5.
In closing, the state argued: “When he was stopped, the defendant was in his
own car, a car he was selling, sitting in the driver’s seat right next to where the
methamphetamine was found.” Id. at p. 243, ln. 13-15. The state further argued:
We know the methamphetamine couldn’t have been there long or it wouldn't
have been there at all. That narrows down the list of people who could have
placed that methamphetamine there to two: That’s the defendant and his
passenger. One of those two individuals owned the car. The other had very little
connection to it. In fact, needed a ride around the block to learn whether or not
he might even be interested in buying it. It suggests that he had very little
previous contact with that car, if ever.
Id. at p. 245, ln. 14-19.
Photographs admitted at trial show the car was riddled with trash and
miscellaneous objects, most of which must have already been in the car when
Arnold retook possession of it on the night in question. Exhibits. Because trial
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counsel failed to explain that Arnold was the car’s mechanic, the jury assumed that
Arnold had a primary user’s knowledge of the car’s content. It was critical to
Arnold’s defense that the jury understand his limited relationship to the car and
that Berdine had prior access.
Trial counsel’s explanation for not calling Jennifer as a witness establishes
that he failed to interview her or otherwise make himself aware of the relevance of
her testimony. Had trial counsel interviewed Jennifer, he would have recognized
that the relevance of her testimony went far beyond “pointing the finger” and that
she had relevant knowledge to refute the state’s theory of the case. Moreover, the
absence of Jennifer as a witness undermines confidence in the trial’s outcome and
establishes a reasonable probability the jury would have acquitted Arnold absence
counsel’s deficient performance. The district court erred in dismissing the petition.
b.

trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel
by failing to call Berdine

Trial counsel sought to present evidence of Berdine’s conviction for
methamphetamine in a separate case to establish that he was familiar with
methamphetamine. Tr. (41730, 4-30-13) p. 225, ln. 2-15. Trial counsel also sought to
introduce evidence that officers thoroughly searched the vehicle because Berdine
had recently been caught with an ounce of methamphetamine taped Id. at p. 223,
10-17. The district court precluded evidence of Berdine’s prior possession of
methamphetamine in part because he had no access to the driver’s door where the
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container was found. See id. at p. 227, ln. 5 - p. 288, ln. 138. According to trial
counsel’s testimony at the evidentiary hearing, Berdine informed him that he had
found the container at a construction site and given it to Arnold. Trial counsel
decided not to call Berdine as a witness because he would probably testify that
“Anderson had methamphetamine and knew it was methamphetamine.”
Again, trial counsel’s failure to conduct a meaningful investigation caused
him to misconstrue the relevance of Berdine’s potential testimony. R. 330. Berdine
had frequently driven the vehicle, including earlier on the night in question, and the
vehicle had been stored behind the apartment building in which Berdine lived and
was being stored behind the passenger.
Berdine’s testimony regarding these other issues (and not his knowledge of
the container, which was likely to result in a Fifth Amendment invocation) would
have helped the jury understand Berdine and Arnold’s respective relationship to the
vehicle. Had such testimony been presented, there is a reasonable probability the
trial would have resulted in acquittal.

16

c.

trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel
by failing to present evidence that Berdine was
unsupervised

Officer Applewhite testified at trial that he arrived on scene before Arnold
was removed from the vehicle and observed Berdine with a clear view through nontinted glass until he was removed from the vehicle. On cross-examination Officer
Applewhite testified that Officer Woodward gave him a verbal command to watch
the passenger. Tr. (41730, 4-30-13) p. 207, ln. 1-4. Trial counsel then asked: “So we
played the audio, and that command isn’t on here in the first ten, 15 minutes.” Id.
at p. 208, ln. 2-3. The state objected that trial counsel was commenting on evidence
that had not been admitted and the district court sustained the objection. Id. at p.
208, ln. 4-6. Trial counsel did not thereafter attempt to impeach Officer Applewhite
or otherwise introduce Officer audio, which fails to reflect any verbal command to
watch the passenger before Arnold was removed from the vehicle.
At the evidentiary hearing, Jennifer and Arnold’s son testified that when
they arrived on the scene, their father had been arrested and placed in a patrol
vehicle and that Berdine remained in the car without an officer standing at the
passenger window. Tr. (45047, 2-2-17) p. 29, ln. 1-24; p. 41, ln. 13 - p. 42, ln. 21.
Arnold testified that Berdine was left alone in the car for five to ten minutes. Id. at
76, ln. 25 - p. 77, ln. 16; 82, ln. 10-24. At the evidentiary hearing, Officer Applewhite
initially testified that Arnold was outside the car when he arrived on scene. Id. at p.
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116, ln. 20 - p. 117, ln. 18. After the prosecutor reminded him of his trial testimony,
Officer Applewhite changed his testimony to reflect that he was present when
Arnold was removed from the vehicle.
In dismissing Arnold’s petition, the district court found Officer Applewhite’s
jury trial testimony the most credible and that Berdine was constantly surveyed
while sitting in the passenger seat of the vehicle. R. 657-58. However, the question
for the district court was not whether Berdine was constantly supervised but,
rather, whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present available evidence
that established Berdine had the opportunity to leave the container in the car.
There could be no sound strategic strategy for not challenging Officer
Applewhite’s testimony that he arrived before Officer Woodward removed Arnold
from the vehicle and constantly surveyed Berdine. Indeed, trial counsel attempted
to cast doubt on Officer Applewhite’s testimony by questioning why the alleged
verbal command was not audible on the audio recording. Trial counsel nevertheless
failed to present available testimony contradicting the officer or admit Officer
Woodward’s audio to demonstrate that the verbal command was not reflected on the
audio recording. Instead, trial counsel’s failure to present available evidence
regarding Berdine’s supervision in the vehicle resulted from inadequate
preparation, including failing to interview Jennifer and Arnold’s son.
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Trial counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced Arnold in two ways. First,
the state was able to argue in closing that Berdine “had no access to and no
opportunity to access the location where the methamphetamine was recovered. He
was watched by an officer the entire time he was in that car.” Tr. (41730, 4-30-13) p.
245, ln. 20-24 Second, the absence of any evidence that Berdine had an opportunity
to place the container contributed to the district court’s preclusion of evidence that
Berdine had been arrested for methamphetamine shortly before the stop in this
case and had pled guilty. Id. at p. 225, ln. 16 - p. p. 228, ln. 3. Had trial counsel
admitted available evidence that Berdine was not constantly supervised, there is a
reasonable probability the trial’s outcome would have been different.
d.

trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel
by failing to provide Arnold with complete copies of
discovery and review that discovery with him

Arnold asked his attorney to provide all discovery. Tr. (45047, 2-2-17) p. 61,
ln. 21 - p. 62, ln. 9. On February 20, 2013, Arnold sent his attorney a kite2
indicating “you told me twice that you would send me the complete discovery and I
have not received it . . . Please send ASAP the complete discovery.” Exhibit 14.

Kite is the commonly used term to refer to official communications between inmates and jail
personnel. It is also the term utilized by the district court and parties in this case to refer to
Arnold’s communication to his attorney and court access requests. While apparently universally
accepted and used in correctional facilities across the country, its origin is apparently a mystery.
See https://jailmedicine.wordpress.com/2012/01/29/kite-where-did-that-come-from/.
2
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Nevertheless, Arnold did not receive complete discovery and was not provided the
the officers’ audio recordings.
Trial counsel testified that he had no memory of the kite but that if he
received the kite, he would have provided the discovery. The district court accepted
trial counsel’s “testimony as more-probably correct, and therefore concludes that
Anderson’s requests were satisfied.” R. 668. However, trial counsel’s testimony only
establishes what he would have done if he had received the kite of which he had no
recollection.
Arnold specifically testified that he reviewed audio recordings for the first
time when he received the exhibits from his direct appeal and discovered the
recording revealed his daughter asserting ownership over the car. Tr. (45047,
2-2-17) p. 62, ln. 12-25. Arnold thought to himself, “this is what I was asking for.
She’s on there. Why wasn’t she in court?” Id. at p. 62, ln. 23-25.
The district court noted that Arnold was present for the suppression hearing
and the audio played as part of the hearing apprised Arnold of what the evidence
was in such recordings. However, the transcript from the suppression hearing
establishes that excerpts from the audio recording reflecting Arnold’s interactions
with law enforcement. Tr. (41730, 4-5-13) p. 10-17. No portion following Arnold’s
transport to jail, which is when requested to take the vehicle, was played at the

20

suppression hearing. Thus, the district court’s finding that the hearing apprised
Arnold of the recordings’ contents is clearly erroneous.
The district court also found that Arnold did not identify the specific
discovery that would have effected Arnold’s input to trial counsel to assist in his
defense and how having such information would have impacted the outcome. R. 668.
However, Arnold testified that if he had listened to two audios, he would have been
aware of the other witnesses on the scene who could have potentially provided
testimony at trial. Tr. (45047, 2-2-17) p. 75, ln. 10-14. Arnold testified that full
discovery would have given him a better opportunity to participate in his defense
because he would have known who was there and could have subpoenaed witnesses
in his favor. Id. at p. 75, ln. 15-20. Specifically, “like I said, I didn't even know my
daughter had picked the car up at that time because I didn't -- I hadn't even heard
until I got the things back from the supreme court. Id. at p. 75, ln. 21-25.
Trial counsel failed to call Jennifer apparently under the mistaken belief that
her testimony would only be relevant to argue the container of methamphetamine
belonged to her. Reviewing and discussing the audio recordings with Arnold could
have helped trial counsel understand the importance of Jennifer’s testimony. Trial
counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to provide Arnold with
complete discovery.
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e.

trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel
by failing to obtain fingerprint analysis of the container
or obtain independent testing of the substance found
therein

Arnold testified that he first saw the container with methamphetamine
found in his car as an exhibit during the preliminary hearing. Tr. (45047, 2-2-17) p.
56, ln. 9 - p. 57, ln. 12. Arnold told his attorney to obtain fingerprint analysis of the
container because it was plastic and would hold fingerprints, unlike a baggie. Id. at
p. 56, ln. 15-24. Arnold told his attorney “You are going to get it and you are going
to find out somebody had that in their hand. Id. at p. 56, ln. 22-24. Arnold also
asked trial counsel to obtain independent testing on the substance in the container
because it “could be cheek makeup” for all he knew. Id. at p. 60, ln. 14-23.
Arnold also explained that he does not search through the vehicles he is
working on. Tr. (45047, 2-2-17) p. 59, ln. 18-24. He testified that had been in and
out of the car and under the hood but that he did not “look for stuff, especially
something like” the container the methamphetamine was found in. Id. at p. 60, ln.
5-12. Arnold testified:
If I would have seen something like [the container], that looks like eye
makeup bottle. Even if I had seen it, I wouldn't have said, "Oh, that’s
methamphetamine” . . . I wouldn't even have paid any attention even if I
would have noticed that.
Id. at p. 60, ln. 11-13.
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The district court found trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance
because “such tests would have done nothing to assist Anderson’s defense, with the
container being found next to the driver’s seat in which Anderson was seated.” R
676. This finding presumes Arnold’s guilt and reflects trial counsel’s failure to
investigate Arnold’s relationship with the car and others’ access to it, including
Berdine’s possession of the vehicle earlier in the evening. Arnold was insistent on
his innocence, was certain his fingerprints would not be on the container and did
not know whether the substance was truly methamphetamine. In these
circumstances, it was unreasonable for trial counsel to fail to obtain fingerprint
testing of the container and independent testing of its contents.
The district court also found that even if trial counsel should have honored
Arnold’s requests to fingerprint the container and to independently test the
substance, he “has utterly failed to show what prejudice he suffered” as there “has
been no showing what the fingerprinting, lab testing or weighing would have shown
that would have made a difference” in the trial’s outcome.
However, Arnold testified that the first time he saw the container was in a
photograph presented as an exhibit at the preliminary hearing. It necessarily
follows that Arnold’s fingerprints would not be on a container he had never seen.
Since the container was plastic and could hold a print, fingerprint testing showing
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Arnold’s fingerprints were not on the container would have been critical evidence
establishing Arnold did not knowingly possess methamphetamine.
f.

ineffective assistance of counsel and denial of selfrepresentation at sentencing

After trial, trial counsel and Arnold got into an argument during a conference
that had been scheduled to review the PSI. Id. at p. 64, ln. 1-10. As a result, Arnold
was unable to inform trial counsel of several mistakes in the PSI, including that he
had been convicted of eight prior felonies. Id. at p. 64, ln. 10 p. 65, ln. 10. Arnold
was arrested in a new criminal case the night before he was scheduled for
sentencing in the first case and the matter was re-scheduled. App. Exh Tr.
(CV42-15-3479, 7-9-13) p. 26, ln. 10-22.
After the argument, another attorney was assigned to represent Arnold at
sentencing and to represent him in a second case pending trial. Id. at p. 66, ln.
16-23; p. 68, ln. 11 - p. 69, ln. 11; see also Augmentation 4-15-15, 41730. The new
attorney also failed to review the PSI with Arnold and ignored his requests for
discovery in the new case. Arnold did not want to represent himself but wanted to
be represented at sentencing by an attorney who had his best interests in heart. Tr.
(45047, 2-2-17) 67, ln. 17 - p. 68, ln. 20; p. 70, ln. 14-21. Arnold did not want the
second attorney to represent him at sentencing. Id. p. 70, ln. 22-25.
The district court found that it could not “determine, based on the record
that” Arnold requested to represent himself at sentencing because the “‘evidence’
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supporting that claim is a passing reference in a sentencing transcript from
another case where Judge Stoker referenced some kind of discussion with Anderson
previously about Anderson’s request to represent himself.” R. 673.
However, the state asked the district court to judicially notice the underlying
criminal case and specifically attached: “Bond Reduction Hearing October 1, 2013,
Hearing on Motion for New Counsel October 4, 2013, Sentencing Hearing November
25, 2013.” R. 514. At the beginning of the evidentiary hearing, the district court
granted the state’s request and indicated it would judicially notice the transcripts
attached to the state’s request. Tr. (45047, 2-2-17) p. 6, ln. 3-18.
These transcripts reveal that on October 1, 2013, the second attorney
appeared on Arnold’s behalf and the district court inquired:
I’m assuming that your office has resolved any conflict issues with Mr.
Anderson? As I recall, the last hearing we had, [the first public defender] was
relieved of representation at Mr. Arnold Anderson's request, and I assume
that your office reassigned internally, and we're good to go?
Tr. (41730, 10-1-13) p. 3, 14-19. Counsel responded that Arnold wished to hire
private counsel and was preparing a post-conviction relief petition pertaining trial
counsel’s representation. Id. at p. 3, ln. 20 - p. 4, ln. 2. Counsel explained the chief
public defender had decided their office would continue representing Arnold in the
pending cases. Id. at p. 4, ln. 3-5.
However, after the district court denied the bond reduction, Arnold informed
the district court: “I’d like to file a motion to have [the second attorney] relieved
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from the case.” Id. at p. 12, ln. 2-3. The district court replied: “Denied. It’s denied.”
Id. at p. 12, ln. 4. Three days later, the district court explained that he had
summarily denied the request because there had been insufficient time to hear it
that day. Tr. (41730, 10-4-13) p. 13, 18-24. The district court recognized that Arnold
had a right to be heard and so scheduled a hearing. Id. at p. 13, ln. 24 - p. 14, ln. 4.
Arnold explained that the second attorney was with the same office as the first
attorney, who had provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to call
witness, fingerprint the container and present evidence to defend his case. Id. at p.
15, ln. 11 - p. 16, ln. 8. Arnold indicated it was inappropriate to have a different
public defender from the same office that had provided ineffective assistance of
counsel and against he was preparing a petition for post-conviction relief. Id. at p.
21, ln. 15-24.
The district court indicated it would provide Mr. Anderson with a postconviction packet, that had forms to assist him. The district court further found that
Mr. Anderson’s claims against the initial public defender did not impact the current
public defender’s duties to represent Mr. Anderson at sentencing in the first case
and to defend him in the second. Id. at p. 25, ln. 3 - p. 26, ln. 7. The district court
denied the motion to discharge the public defender and advised Mr. Anderson that
he could represent himself or hire counsel. Id. at p. 27, ln. 1-24.
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On October 21, 2013, trial counsel put the district court on notice that Mr.
Anderson wanted to represent himself. Exhibit 10, p. 5 ln. 3-10. On October 22,
2013, trial counsel wrote Arnold informing him that he advised the district court
that Arnold wanted to represent himself. Exhibit 8. Trial counsel indicated the trial
court initially set the issue for a hearing, then changed his mind. Id. Trial counsel
advised Arnold could bring up self-representation at the next hearing. Id.
At sentencing, trial counsel failed to inform the district court of any
corrections to the PSI. Tr. (41730, 11-21-13) p. 4, ln. 20-24. The district court
imposed a unified sentence of ten years with a minimum period of confinement of
three years fixed. Id. at p. 15, ln. 1-3.
The district court erred in failing to consider the record in considering
Arnold’s claims regarding representation at sentencing. The record establishes that
Arnold was deprived of meaningful representation by conflict-free counsel or of the
ability to represent himself at sentencing.
g.

trial counsel’s deficient performance resulted from
inadequate preparation

Arnold claimed he received ineffective assistance of counsel due to counsel’s
lack of preparation. In the pertinent section of his closing argument, Arnold
referenced the “failures enumerated above show failure to prepare.” R. 622. Arnold
further explained that the failure to prepare resulted trial counsel’s failure to
present essential rebuttal facts to the jury, “including ownership of the vehicle,
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access to the vehicle, ownership of the container, contradictory statements by police
officers, and failure to call essential witnesses.” Id.
The district court found that Arnold “has failed to show specifics regarding
the alleged lack of preparation, and has further failed to show how the outcome
would have been different had [trial counsel] done more to prepare.” R. 672. To the
contrary, the sections referenced in the argument specifically incorporate the
individual incidents of deficient performance and allege that inadequate
preparation caused trial counsel’s conduct. R. 617-622.
As argued in each section supra, trial counsel decided not to call Jennifer
based on his misapprehension that the purpose of Jennifer’s testimony would be to
blame her for the methamphetamine. By failing to interview Jennifer and Jacob,
trial counsel failed to understand Arnold and Berdine’s respective relationships to
the vehicle and discover evidence to refute Officer Applewhite’s claim that he
consistently watched Berdine through a non-tinted window. Trial counsel’s failure
to investigate served to reinforce his mistaken preconception that Arnold was
guilty. That erroneous belief thus led to trial counsel’s misinformed decisions to
obtain neither fingerprint analysis nor independent testing of the substance would.
The district court denied Arnold’s cumulative error claim, “finding no errors,
this court consequently finds no accumulation of errors.” R. 678. However, as
described in detail above, counsel’s lack of preparation led to several incidences of

28

deficient performance. Even if each of those incidences alone are not sufficient to
cast doubt on the process’ reliability, the cumulative effect of those errors establish.
Because of trial counsel’s inadequate preparation, the jury heard no evidence
that: Jennifer primarily owned the car, Arnold only possessed it while doing repairs,
that Berdine frequently used the vehicle, that Berdine used the vehicle earlier in
the evening before turning it over to Arnold and that Arnold’s fingerprints were not
on the container. Had the jury heard this evidence, there is a reasonable probability
the outcome of the trial would have been different. The district court erred in
denying Arnold’s petition for post-conviction relief.
B.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Declining To Order
Production Of The Metadata Associated With The Audio
Recordings Of The Underlying Criminal Proceedings
Arnold moved the district for an order to prepare verified court transcripts,

audio discs and metadata of all hearings in his criminal cases. R. 247. Arnold
explained that the transcripts failed to accurately reflect the proceedings and that
the metadata would ensure their accuracy. Arnold also cited to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 34 as authority to order the metadata. Tr. (45047, 5-16-16) p. 7, ln. 21-25.
The district court ordered that certified transcripts be provided at county
expense and that counsel could compare those transcript with the audio recordings.
Tr. (45047, 5-16-16) p. 10, ln. 4-17; see also R 271. The district court ruled it was
“not making a denial absolutely regarding the metadata at this point” and that if
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discrepancies were discovered, the district court would schedule a hearing to further
address the request. Tr. (45047, 5-16-16) p. 10, ln. 20-25.
At a subsequent status conference, Arnold expressed continued concern that
transcripts and audio recordings had been altered. Tr. (45047, 11-14-16) p. 5, ln. 12
- p. 9, ln. 25. Specifically, Arnold asserted the transcript of a proceeding held on
March 24, 2014 had been altered. Id. at p. 13, ln. 25 - p. p. 14, ln. 5. While the
hearing was held in a different criminal case, the district court and parties
discussed Arnold’s Rule 35 motion, which had been filed in both cases, and his
request to represent himself. Id. at p. 21, ln. 21 - p. 23, ln. 3. The district court
denied Arnold’s request for the metadata. Id. at p. 23, ln. 4-8.
While the discovery rules in the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure do not
automatically apply in post-conviction relief proceedings, the district court has the
discretion to order discovery to protect a petitioner’s substantial rights. Idaho
Criminal Rule 57(b); Raudebaugh v. State, 135 Idaho 602, 605, 21 P.3d 924, 927
(2001). Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 34(b), federal courts have ordered parties to produce
electronically stored information (“ESI”) with metadata where the opposing party
has satisfactorily shown that metadata was relevant and necessary for meaningful
ESI production. John B. v. Goetz, 879 F. Supp. 2d 787, 881 (M.D. Tenn. 2010). Idaho
Rule of Civil Procedure 34 is patterned after the federal rule and also provides the
court authority to order a party to produce ESI in a particular format. Cf.
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Fed.R.Civ.P. 34(b) with I.R.C.P. 34(b). Idaho courts prefer to interpret the Idaho
Rules of Civil Procedure in conformance with the interpretation placed upon the
same language in the federal rules. Wait v. Leavell Cattle, Inc., 136 Idaho 792, 796,
41 P.3d 220, 224 (2001).
Here, Arnold informed the district court that the transcripts incorrectly
reflected what had occurred. He pleaded with the district court: “All I wanted was
the truth. Never asked any man to lie for me or nothing, or I ain't come here to lie. I
just wanted all the evidence so I can present a defense.” Tr. (45047, 11-14-16) p. 9,
ln. 5-9. Arnold explained that Exhibit L to his petition was relevant to his right to
self-representation and illustrated how the issues interrelated due to “crossfertilization.” Id. at p. 14, ln. 1-5. The transcript attached to the petition as Exhibit
L and admitted as Exhibit 12 reflects a sentencing proceeding in the other criminal
case and discusses Arnold’s right to self-representation in both cases. Several
discussions are labeled “off the record discussion between counsel and defendant”
and not transcribed.
Arnold harbored serious concerns regarding alterations to the transcripts and
audio recordings of proceedings, which were necessary to prosecute his postconviction claims. Production of the metadata was thus necessary to protect
Arnold’s substantial rights and the district court abused its discretion in declining
to grant Arnold’s motion.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Arnold established that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and this
Court should reverse the district court’s judgment dismissing Arnold’s petition and
remand with instruction to grant his requested relief. Arnold further asks the Court
to reverse the district court’s denial of the metadata and remand with instruction to
grant that motion.
Respectfully submitted this 21st day of November 2017.
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